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Constitutional Law: Oklahoma Mortgage Foreclosure
Moratoriums . . Past, Present, and Future?
Introduction
In 1986, in response to increased farm foreclosures and a generally
distressed farm economy, the Oklahoma State Legislature enacted the
Oklahoma Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium Act (the "Act").' The Act
was to remain in effect from May 21, 1986 until May 21, 1987. During
this period, the Act prevented the Federal Land Bank of Wichita, and the
local Federal Land Bank Associations (the "Associations"), from initiating
foreclosure actions in Oklahoma's state court system.
While the Act was in effect, the Federal Land Bank filed several foreclosure actions in Oklahoma's state courts. The landowners in these action
sought protection under the Act. In several cases, the trial court declared
the Act unconstitutional. 2 Before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma could
review the issue, the Act expired by its own terms. Although the Act had
expired, the court granted certiorari in Federal Land Bank v. Story.3 In
Story, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the contracts clause
of both the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions. 4 Thus, the land
owners were unable to gain protection from foreclosure under the Act.
This note analyzes the court's holding in Story and discusses several
additional constitutional issues relating to the Act. This discussion is
necessary because of the cyclical nature of economic distress in the agricultural sector. In the past, the Oklahoma Legislature has dealt with
economic distress in the agricultural sector by enacting a mortgage foreclosure moratorium during an economic emergency. 5 Other states have
also used mortgage foreclosure moratoriums during periods of economic
emergency. 6 Economic emergencies will surely recur in the future and one
possible response to future economic emergencies is the enactment of a
mortgage foreclosure moratorium. This note will explore the feasibility of
mortgage foreclosure moratoriums as a response to economic distress. The
format for this analysis includes a review of the constitutional shortcomings
of the Act and a survey of case law from other jurisdictions addressing
the constitutionality of mortgage foreclosure moratoriums.
1. 62 OKLA. STAT. §§ 492-493 (Supp. 1989). The text of the Act is also set forth in
Federal Land Bank v. Story, 756 P.2d 588, 589 (Okla. 1988).
2. Appeal Numbers 68,077; 63,683; 68,684; 68,872; 68,874; 68,902; 68,903; 68,917; 69,035;
and 69,036. Story, 756 P.2d at 589.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 589.
5. 1933 Okla. Sess. Laws §§ 1-4.
6. See IowA CODE § 654.15 (1950) (continuation of foreclosures in certain situations);
1943 N.Y. Laws 93 (one year suspension on mortgage principal payments); 1933 Minn. Laws
339 (postponment of judicial sales and extension of redemption period).
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Confrohting Economic Crisis
The use of moratorium legislationi as a form of debtor relief during7
ecoiomic crisis is a practice that arose early in our nation's legal history.
Before the 1930's, these attempts at debtor relief were generally overruled
by the Uhited States Supreme Court as violations of the contracts clause
of the United States Constitution.,
The "Great Depression" of the 1930's influenced some states to enact
mnrtgage moratorium legislation. 9 This economic emdrgency gave rise to
various type5 of mortgage moratoriuni legislation. 10 These acts sought to
provide short term relief for debtors by postpbning judicial sale of property
or by extending. periods of statutory redemption. This approach presupposed that economic conditions would eventually improve and that mortgagors would be able to resume payments on their debts.
During the 1930's, many mortgagors were unable to fulfill their mortgage
obligations and were, therefore, ,subject to foreclosure proceedings. This
economic environment made mortgage foreclosure moratoriums a very
popular means for state legislatures to provide immediate relief in response
to the'public outcry over economic conditions.
In 1933, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted the Oklahoma Mortgage
Moratorium Act (the "1933 Act")."1 Section 1 of the 1933 Act, which
applied to mortgage foreclosure actions already pending, extended the time
to answer and postponed trial and judgment for nine months.' 2 The
7. Kempter,- ConstitutionalLaw-Due Process Of Law-Moratoria Acts, 9 NOTRE DAM
L. REv. 328, 329 (1934).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 328.
10. Id.
11. 1933 Okla. Sess. Laws §§ 1-8, cited in State ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield, 167 Okla. 209,
29 P.2d 24 (1934).
12. Section 1 of the 1933 Act provided as follows:
In all actions now pending in the courts of this State, for the foreclosure of
mortgages or other liens upon real estate, where the answer of the defendant or
defendants has not been filed, such defendant or defendants shall not be held to
answer therein until the expiration of nine (9) months after the date of the service
of summons upon the defendant who is the record owner of the real estate, at
the time of the filing of suit upon which the mortgage or other lien is sought to
be foreclosed, and
In all actions hereafter filed in the courts of this State for the foreclosure of
mortgages or other liens upon real estate, the defendant or defendants shall not
be held to answer therein 'until the expiration of nine (9) months after the date
of the service of summons upon the defendant who is the record owner of the
property at the time of the filing of suit upon which the mortgage or other lien
is sought to be foreclosed, and
In all actions now pending in the courts of the State, for the foreclosure of
mortgages or other liens upon real estate, in which the answer of defendant or
defendants has already been filed, no trial shall be had, and no court of this
state shall render judgment therein, until the expiration of nine (9) months after
the passage and approval of this Act, upon which the mortgage or other lien is
sought to be foreclosed.
1933 Okla. Sess. Laws § 1.
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remaining sections of the 1933 Act applied to foreclosure actions initiated
after the effective date of the 1933 Act. In these actions, the district courts
were given discretion to grant continuances on a case-by-case basis. However, the owner was required to pay interest, taxes and reasonable rental
accruing during the continuation. 3 In Roth v. Waterfield, 4 the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma declared section one of the 1933 Act unconstitutional
because it impaired existing contracts and violated the Oklahoma and
United States Constitutions. The Court held the remaining sections of the
1933 Act to be within constitutional limits, and the sections were enforced.'

5

Several other agricultural states, including Iowa and Minnesota, also
enacted mortgage moratorium legislation in 1933.16 In Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell,7 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law. This
departure from past treatment of debtor relief legislation by the Supreme
Court rejuvenated mortgage moratorium acts. However, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, on a rehearing of Roth, held that the Oklahoma Act was
distinguishable from the Minnesota Act considered in Blaisdell. Therefore,
the court reaffirmed its original decision. 8
Clearly, mortgage foreclosure moratoriums are not a new concept in
Oklahoma or other states. Subtle differences in state mortgage moratorium
laws have led to different holdings on the constitutionality of these laws.
This historical perspective should be helpful when analyzing the recent
treatment of Oklahoma mortgage moratorium legislation. It should also
be helpful in proposing workable alternatives to the Act which will pass
constitutional muster.
FederalLand Bank v. Story
The Federal Land Bank of Wichita filed a mortgage foreclosure action
in the District Court of Craig County, Oklahoma, against Jim and Margie
Story, on August 7, 1986. The Storys sought protection under the Act
and filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court held the Act unconstitutional.' 9 The Attorney General intervened on the landowners' behalf 0 and
2
the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari. '
13. Roth, 29 P.2d at 25-26.
14. Id. at 32.
15. Id.
16. See 1933 Iowa Acts 211, ch. 182, § 1; 1933 Minn. Laws 339.
17. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
18. Roth, 29 P.2d at 38. The court noted that the Oklahoma Act was distinguishable from
the Minnesota Act because the Oklahoma Act granted a fixed extension of time to answer in
any foreclosure action pending or to be filed while the Minnesota Act granted extensions based
on judicial discretion. Id. at 35. In addition, the Minnesota Act granted extensions upon the
condition that the mortgagor pay a reasonable rental value during the time of the extension.
Id. The Oklahoma Act extended the time to answer without compensating the mortgagee. Id.
19. Story, 756 P.2d at 589.
20. See 12 OKLaA. STAT. § 2024(D) (Supp. 1986) for authority of state to intervene.
21. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the landowners but the trial court
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The majority, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Doolin, held the
Act unconstitutional as a violation of the contracts clause of the Oklahoma
and United States Constitutions. 22 These provisions of both constitutions
prohibit the passing of any laws impairing the obligation of contracts.23
The court outlined several questions which must be asked to determine
if a law violates the contracts clause of either the Oklahoma or United
States Constitution. The first question that a court must answer is whether
state action caused the alleged impairment.24 The second question is whether
state action substantially impaired the existing contracts. 25 If the contracts
were substantially impaired, the state must identify some legitimate public
interest that justifies the impairment. 26 Finally, if there was a substantial
impairment, the adjustment of the rights of the contracting parties must
be based upon reasonable conditions and be appropriate to the public
27
purpose which justifies the action.
In this case, the court easily decided the first two steps of the analysis.
28
Because the state legislature passed the Act, it was clearly a state action.
The Act prohibited foreclosures for one year on mortgages that were
2 9
granted before the Act. Therefore, it clearly impaired existing contracts.
At this point in its analysis, the court placed substantial weight on its
previous decision in Roth v. Waterfield3 0 The court noted that the Act
closely paralleled section 1 of the 1933 Act by prohibiting the Federal
Land Bank from initiating any foreclosure action in Oklahoma courts
during the life of the Act. Therefore, this review was simplified by the
3
application of stare decisis. '

21. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the landowners but the trial court
reaffirmed its earlier decision. The Attorney General filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Before the parties could fully brief the question, the Act expired
by its own terms on May 21, 1987. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari for two
reasons. First, there were ten pending appeals on the same issue. Second, there was a chance
that the act could be revived and would expire again before the court had an opportunity to
review the issue. The court stated that "mootness will not act as a bar when the challenged
event is capable of repetition yet evading review." Story, 756 P.2d at 589.
22. Id. at 593. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6.
23. The United States Constitution states that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty ....
pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,
or grant any title of Nobility." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
24. Story, 756 P.2d at 590-91.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 591.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 590.
29. Id.
30. 167 Okla. 209, 29 P.2d 24 (1933). See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. In Roth,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that section 1 of the 1933 Act amounted to an arbitrary
and capricious extension of time. The extension resulted in the taking of private property
without compensation or protection of the rights of the mortgagee. Id. at 38.
31. Story, 756 P.2d at 591.
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The Oklahoma Attorney General argued. that section 493 of the Act 32
allowed the Federal Land Bank to sell mortgages to the Capital Corporation33
which could then bring foreclosure actions. 34 This option provided an
alternative remedy to replace the remedy that was eliminated by the Act.
Therefore, the Act did not substantially impair contractual obligations.
The court rejected this argument because it found that requiring mortgagees to divest themselves of all contractual rights, by assigning them to
a third party, was not an alternative remedy, but a destruction of their
contract rights.3 5 The court held that the existence of emergency conditions
did not justify the legislature's action because it was not a reasonable
36
exercise of the state's police power in view of the emergency.
Justice Hodges, in his dissent, argued that although the Act affected
existing contracts, it was appropriate for the existing emergency and was
based upon reasonable conditions. He noted that, unlike the 1933 Act,
the 1986 Oklahoma Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium Act provided an
alternative to the mortgagee. The Federal Land Bank could sell the mortgage to the Capital Corporation and the mortgage could then be foreclosed.
The legislature reasonably limited the Act to apply to the Federal Land
Banks because they were the only lenders who could sell to the Capital
Corporation. Therefore, the Act did not permanently divest the mortgagee
of any remedy because the prohibition on foreclosures was only for the
one year life of the Act. 37 During this one year period, the mortgagee was

32. The text of section 493 states:
There is hereby declared a period of deferment of not longer than one (1) year
from the date of the enactment of this act, during which time the Federal Land
Bank of Wichita and any Federal Land Bank Association are prohibited from
initiating a foreclosure action in the courts of this state. How;ever, nothing in
this act shall prohibit the Capital Corporation from initiating a foreclosure action
from and after this date so long as the Capital Corporation has determined that
the loan or loans held by the borrower or borrowers are ineligible for restructuring
assistance.
62 Osu.A. STAT. § 493 (Supp. 1989).
33. In 1985, Congress enacted the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 in order to
strengthen the operations of the Farm Credit System. Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (1985). Part DI of the Act established the Farm Credit
System Capital Corporation. 99 Stat. 1678, 1680. The Corporation was to provide assistance
to institutions in the Farm Credit System and their borrowers. The Corporation was given the
authority to accomplish this purpose through acquiring non-performing loans from other Farm
Credit System institutions and providing assistance in restructuring or refinancing loans of
member borrowers. Id.
34. The Attorney General relied on Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124, 128-29 (1937), where the Supreme Court held that "the particular
remedy existing at the date of the contract may be altogether abrogated if another equally
effective for the enforcement of the obligation remains or is substituted for the one taken
away.,$
35. Story, 756 P.2d at 593.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 596.
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not divested of all remedies because they had the option to sell the
mortgage to the Capital Corporation. s
The Contract Clause
Any analysis concerning whether a mortgage moratorium law complies
with the contract clause of the United States Constitution must begin with
the seminal case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell. 9
Blaisdell was the United States Supreme Court's first opportunity to review
one of the state mortgage moratorium laws enacted as a result of the
Great Depression. The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act extended the
periods for judicial sale and redemption by the mortgagor. This extension
was available only when the mortgagor made application to the court and
paid a reasonable rental value on the property to be applied toward
40
payment of taxes, insurance, interest and mortgage indebtedness.
Blaisdell held that the Constitution's limitation on the impairment of
contracts should not be interpreted as an absolute bar. 4' The contract
clause must be construed to allow the states to exercise their protective
power in the event of an emergency in spite of a temporary restraint on
the enforcement of contractual obligations. 42 The Court noted that the
state's right to exercise its police power to protect its citizens applied to
economic emergencies as well as natural disasters. 43 The Court also advocated a balancing analysis where neither the limitation on the impairment
of contracts, nor the states right to exercise its power to protect the public
welfare, is completely eliminated." To survive this balance, the state's
action must be addressed to a legitimate purpose which justified the
exercise of police power. 45 After the Court's decision in Blaisdell, impairment of contracts was apparently allowed by the Constitution as long as
the impairment was a result of a reasonable exercise of police power.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in East New York Savings Bank v.
Hahn,46 is also helpful in reconciling the conflicting powers of the contract
clause and the state's authority to impair contracts as a reasonable exercise
of the state's police power. The Hahn rationale treated the state's authority
to exercise its protective power as a condition implied in every contract.
Therefore, when the state reasonably exercises that power, it does not
impair contractual obligations, but rather enforces the implied condition
of the contract. 47 Although this is a circular theoretical journey, it upholds
38. Id. at 597.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Id. at 416-18.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 439.
Id.
326 U.S. 230 (1945).
Id. at 232.
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the commonsense notion that the framers of the Constitution did not
intend to completely eliminate the state's ability to protect its citizens
simply because some private contractual obligations would be impaired.
Substantial deference should be given to a state legislature when deter4
mining whether the exercise of the state's protective power is reasonable. 1
As directly elected officials, legislators are best qualified to determine what
steps are necessary to protect the public welfare. In Hahn, the Supreme
Court validated an extension of the New York Mortgage Moratorium Law
which was first enacted in 1933.49 Like the Minnesota Act considered in
Blaisdell, the New York Act required the mortgagor to pay taxes, insurance, and interest during the period the foreclosure was postponed.10
The protection of mortgage indebtedness is a key factor in deciding
whether a mortgage foreclosure moratorium is considered a reasonable
exercise of state police power. In Blaisdell, the Court noted that although
the means of enforcing contractual obligations were postponed, payment
of a reasonable rental value protected the mortgagee.-" State supreme
courts have viewed the impairment of mortgage indebtedness as an important distinguishing factor. Therefore, many states have declared moratorium legislation invalid as a violation of the contract clause.52
As noted earlier, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the 1933 Act
unconstitutional as a violation of the contract clause. 53 After the Blaisdell
decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding. 4 In
a more recent case, the Kansas Supreme Court declared the Kansas Family
Farm Rehabilitation Act unconstitutional because it also violated the contract clause. 5 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act was facially
unconstitutional because it impaired the mortgaged indebtedness, altered
the rate of interest, permitted partial redemption of mortgaged property
and provided inadequate protection for the mortgagee. 6 The Kansas Family Farm Rehabilitation Act impaired mortgage indebtedness by allowing
the mortgagor to redeem the property at the greater of the fair market
48. Id. at 232-33.
49. Id. at 235. The Court determined that the New York moratorium legislation was the
process of legislation at its fairest, for the following reasons: "[F]requent reconsideration,
intensive study of the consequences of what has been done, readjustment to changing conditions,
and safeguarding the future based on responsible forecasts." Id. at 234-35.
50. Id. at 231.
51. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445-46.
52. See State ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield, 167 Okla. 209, 29 P.2d 24 (1934). See also Federal
Land Bank v. Bott, 240 Kan. 624, 732 P.2d 710 (1987) (Family Farm Rehabilitation Act found
to be unconstitutional because it impaired mortgage indebtedness, altered the contract rate of

interest, permitted partial redemption of mortgaged property and provided inadequate protection for the mortgagee).
53. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.

54. The court noted there was not a conflict between Roth and Blaisdell because section I
of the 1933 Act was an arbitrary extension of time that did not provide for compensation or
protection of the rights of the mortgagee. 29 P.2d at 38.
55. Bott, 732 P.2d at 718.

56. Id.
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value at the initial hearing or at the time of redemption. Both values were
usually much less than the judgment amount. The mortgagee was not
given adequate protection because the mortgagor was permitted to remain
in possession and was not required to pay rent or taxes.
Courts have interpreted Blaisdell and its progeny to allow mortgage
foreclosure moratorium legislation to alter the enforcement of contractual
obligations, but only when the legislation is deemed a reasonable exercise
of the state's police power towards a legitimate endA7 The postponement
of a remedy available to the mortgagee is not a reasonable exercise of this
power when the mortgage indebtedness is impaired or the mortgagee is
not adequately protected through the provision of reasonable rental, interest or payment of taxes on the property."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court correctly applied Blaisdell and its progeny
when it declared the Act unconstitutional as violative of the contract
clause.5 9 Section 493 of the Act granted an unconditional prohibition on
the filing of foreclosure actions by the Federal Land Bank in Oklahoma
state courts. 60 The Act did not contain any provision that protected the
mortgagee's rights during the time the Act was in effect. While the
mortgagor was allowed to retain possession of the property under the
protection of the Act, the mortgagor was not required to pay rent, taxes
or interest. Therefore,. according to the principles used in Blaisdell, the
Act was clearly an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power and
a violation of the contracts clause of the Oklahoma and United States
Constitutions.
The Attorney General argued that because the Act did not prevent
foreclosure actions by the Capital Corporation, the Federal Land Banks
could sell delinquent mortgages to the Capital Corporation who could in
turn foreclose on the property. 6' This was in effect an alternative remedy
available to the Federal Land Bank under the Act. The legislature may
modify, limit or alter a remedy for enforcement of a contract, without
62
impairing its obligations, so long as it does not eliminate all remedies.
"The particular remedy existing at the date of the contract may be
altogether abrogated if another equally effective for the enforcement of
the obligation remains or is substituted for the one taken away." 63
The Capital Corporation was established by the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985.64 The Capital Corporation's purpose was to carry out
a program of financial and technical assistance to institutions within the
57. Id.
58. Id. at 718-19.
59. Story, 756 P.2d at 593.
60. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 493 (Supp. 1989). For the text of section 493, see supra note 32.
61. Story, 756 P.2d at 592.
62. Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust, 300 U.S. 124, 128
(1937).
63. Id. at 128-29.
64. Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (1985). See
supra note 33.
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Farm Credit System (and their borrowers) which are experiencing financial
difficulties.65 One of the means available to accomplish this purpose was
to "acquire from other Farm Credit System institutions and participate
' 66
with such institutions in nonperforming assets of such institutions.
Both the Federal Land Bank and the Capital Corporation are members
of the Farm Credit System. The purpose of the Capital Corporation
mandates a program of financial assistance to the mortgagor rather than
initiation of foreclosure proceedings. The net result is that no member of
the Farm Credit System will be able to foreclose, and the nonperforming
loan will remain in the system. Therefore, under the Act, transfer to the
Capital Corporation was not an equally effective remedy available to the
Federal Land Bank to replace the remedy prohibited by the Act.
67
As the court held in Story, the Act clearly violated the contract clause.
However, ending the constitutional analysis of the Act here would be
premature. Several other constitutional issues raised by the Act were not
addressed by the court. If mortgage moratorium legislation is to be used
in Oklahoma in the future, these issues must be discussed and resolved.
Equal Protection
Although the Story court did not discuss equal protection, the Act did
not appear to satisfy equal protection requirements. Section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." 68 The Act, by its express terms, applied only to the Federal
Land Bank of Wichita and the Associations. At first glance, this would
appear to be an unequal treatment of mortgage lenders by the laws of
Oklahoma.
It is well settled that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment.6 9 Therefore, Associations cannot be denied the
protection of the fourteenth amendment based solely on their business
structure. However, the Constitution does not require that all persons
70
within a jurisdiction receive the same treatment by the laws of that state.
State laws are permitted to use classification to impose restraints on one
class which are not imposed on another.7 1 However, this classification may
not be arbitrary and must be based upon some ground of difference that
is reasonably related to a legitimate purpose.7 2 When determining whether
65. Id. at 1680.
66. Id.
67. Story, 756 P.2d at 593.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
70. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935) (law forbidding
foreign insurance corporations from limiting the time within which suit could be brought
against them on their contracts to less than three years, while no such restriction was placed
on domestic insurers, was not a denial of equal protection).
71. Id.
72. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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a state law violates the equal protection clause, substantial deference should
be given to the decision of the state legislature.7 3 Courts should declare
legislation invalid only if, viewed in light of the facts, it is of such character
as to preclude the assumption that classification rests 4 on some rational
7
basis within the legislators' knowledge and experience.
The scope of Federal Land Bank loans is limited to agricultural land
loans and certain rural housing loans.75 By limiting the application of the
moratorium act to the Federal Land Bank, the legislature sought to provide
relief for agricultural borrowers placed in financial difficulty because of
the slumping agricultural economy. Unless the separate classification of
the Federal Land Bank is rationally related to the purpose of the legislation, the Act violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.
In Oklahoma, many commercial banks grant credit to farmers for the
purchase of land for agricultural use. Therefore, the fact that the Federal
Land Bank lends money primarily for use in the purchase and operation
of agricultural land does not sufficiently distinguish it from commercial
banks to warrant classification. The Federal Land Bank has been held to
be a federal instrumentality.7 6 However, regardless of its federal character,
it operates much like a privately owned lending institution. The differences
between the operation of the Federal Land Bank and commercial banks
are primarily in the administrative operations of the organization rather
than in lending practices. Classification based on different administrative
practices does not reasonably further the goal of providing relief to
distressed agricultural borrowers.
The existence of the Capital Corporation arguably gave the Federal
Land Banks an option not available to other lending institutions, and,
therefore, the classification was proper because other lending institutions
were not similarly situated. However, differences alone do not make
classification proper. The differences must have a fair and substantial
77
relation to the object of the legislation.
Congress established the Capital Corporation to engage in a policy to
restructure eligible loans. It could be argued that the Federal Land Bank
should not be treated differently from commercial banking organizations
73, Brownell, 294 U.S. at 584.
74. Id.
75. Federal law provides:
The credit and financial services authorized in this subchapter may be made

available to persons who are or become stockholders or members of the bank or
associations in the district, and who are(1) bona fide farmers, ranchers, or producers or harvesters or aquatic products;
(2)persons furnishing to farmers and ranchers farm-related services directly related
to their on-farm operating needs; or
(3) owners of rural homes.
12 U,S.C. § 2017 (1988).
76. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935), reh'g denied, 295 U.S. 769

(1934).
77. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415.
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who could develop similar restructuring policies of their own. This unequal
treatment would, in effect, penalize the Federal Land Bank for trying to
help its borrowers. The purposes of the Act would have been better served
by prohibiting all foreclosures. The availability of the Capital Corporation
to the Federal Land Banks probably did not serve as a difference which
would make the classification proper under the equal protection clause.
Any analysis of the classification in this Act would be naive if it ignored
the political realities surrounding enactment of the Act. The Act was
inspired in an economic environment of a faltering agricultural economy
in a state depending heavily on agriculture. A highly visible manifestation
of the poor economy was the unusually high number of mortgage foreclosures on farm land. Many of the mortgages on agricultural lands were
held by the Federal Land Bank. By applying a foreclosure moratorium
exclusively to the Federal Land Bank, the legislature provided immediate
relief that was highly visible. However, the burden of the moratorium was
born by an organization headquartered outside the state of Oklahoma.
This approach satisfied the goal of providing immediate relief to many
agricultural borrowers while avoiding the wrath of the many commercial
banks in Oklahoma who make agricultural loans.
While the foregoing may have been true, the fact remained that the Act
was inconsistent with the limitations of the equal protection clause. The
differences between the Federal Land Bank and commercial lending institutions simply did not form a basis for classification that was rationally
related to the purpose of providing relief to financially distressed mortgagors. The Act could have been equally effective in promoting this goal
if it had been applied to all lending institutions making agricultural land
loans.
A recent Iowa case used this approach to broaden the application of a
law which provided an extension of the period for redemption to all
mortgaged property purchased at forced sales.78 This extended redemption
period had previously only been applied where the property was not
purchased by a member of the FDIC or the FSLIC.7 1 In this case, the
Iowa Supreme Court clearly sends the message that equal protection claims
will not always remove the burden of a law from a select group, but
instead may impose that burden on a larger group.
FederalPreemption
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution states: "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land ... anything
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 80
The preemption doctrine, which arose out of the supremacy clause, holds
78. Federal Land Bank v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Iowa 1988).
79. Id.at 155.
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI,

§

2.
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that certain matters are of such a national character that federal law takes
precedence over state laws.8
The doctrine of preemption is relevant to the Act because the Federal
Land Banks were chartered under the authority of the federal government.
However, it is not patently clear whether Federal Land Banks should be
considered federal entities to be governed exclusively by federal law.
Although the Federal Land Banks were organized under United States2
statutes, the Associations are privately owned by member stockholders.1
It can be argued that because the Associations operate as privately owned
lending institutions, they should be governed by local law. The resolution
of this question is key when determining whether state mortgage foreclosure legislation can be applied to Federal Land Banks. If the Associations
are determined to be federal instrumentalities carrying out governmental
functions, the preemption doctrine would prohibit the application of moratorium legislation to the Associations if the legislation conflicted with
federal law.
In FederalLand Bank v. Priddy, the United States Supreme Court held
that the "[flederal land banks ... are instrumentalities of the federal

government, engaged in the performance of an important governmental
function." 83 The Court noted that federal status was appropriate though
the Federal Land Banks possessed many characteristics of private business
corporations.8 4 The Court reaffirmed this position in FederalLand Bank
v. Bismarck Lumber Co.85 In Bismarck Lumber Co., the Court concluded
that when Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which
the federal government lawfully acts, the activities of that corporation are
governmental.8 6 Further, under its power to make laws, Congress has the
power to protect the instrumentalities which it has constitutionally created. 7 The continuing validity of the Federal Land Bank's federal status
is shown by recent circuit court opinions citing Bismarck Lumber Co. and
Priddy as precedent for that very proposition.88 Based on Bismarck Lumber
Co. and Priddy, Federal Land Banks can probably use the preemption
doctrine as a protection from state laws which conflict with the federal
purpose of the organization.
However, several recent district court decisions have held that the Federal
Land Banks and similar Farm Credit Institutions are not government
81. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
82. Kelley & Hoekstra, Litigation Involving The Farm Credit System And The Rights of
Member-Borrowers of Federal Land Bank Associations (FLBAs) and Production Credit Associations (PCAs) (1988).
83. Priddy, 295 U.S. at 231.
84. Id.

85. 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
86. Id. at 102.
87. Id.

88. See Federal Reserve Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist., 657 F.2d 183, 186 (8th
Cir. 1981.), aff'd, 455 U.S. 995 (1982). See also Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979).
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entities in some circumstances. In United States v. Haynes,8 9 the district
court held that a Production Credit Association was not an "independent
agency" of the United States for the application of a federal criminal
conflicts of interest statute. However, the district court noted that Production Credit Associations are federally chartered instrumentalities. 0 A
federal district court, in Birbeck v. Southern New England PCA,9' held
that Production Credit Associations and Federal Land Banks were not of
sufficient governmental character to grant federal question jurisdiction
solely on that basis. The court characterized both organizations as private
entities rather than governmental agencies. 92
Although it seems inconsistent to allow the Federal Land Bank to claim
federal status in some situations and disclaim that status in others, classifying Federal Land Banks as nonfederal entities has been limited to very
specific purposes. For example, the Birbeck court noted that Congress had
specifically limited federal court jurisdiction based solely on the grounds
that the action was brought by or against a corporation incorporated under
an act of Congress. 93 This narrow exception appears to be the result of
Congress' desire to reduce the case load of the federal courts. The general
rule remains that Federal Land Banks are considered federal instrumentalities.
Where a state lav conflicts with a federal law about a federal instrumentality, state law is preempted by federal law. 94 The preemption doctrine
requires the courts to examine Congressional intent which may be either
express or implied in the structure and purpose of the Congressional
authority. 9 The issue at hand may be resolved by determining whether
Congress explicitly or implicitly manifested an intent to provide the remedy
of judicial foreclosure to Federal Land Banks to be used on nonperforming
loans.
The Congressional declaration of policy and objectives of the Federal
Land Bank states:
It is the objective of this chapter to continue to encourage
farmer- and rancher-borrowers participation in the management,
control and ownership of a permanent system of credit for
agriculture which will be responsive to the credit needs of all
types of agricultural producers having a basis for credit . . .96
The 1971 Farm Credit Act also mandated that Federal Land Bank loans
must not exceed 85% of the appraised value of the real estate security,
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

620 F. Supp. 474, 477 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
Id. at 476.
606 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (D. Conn. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Rust, 597 F.2d at 179.
Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141.
12 U.S.C. § 2001(b) (1988).
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and shall be secured by first liens on interest in real estate. 97 The emphasis
in the declaration of intent, on extending loans only to those having a
basis for credit, along with the strict security requirements set out in the
statutes, implies the right of the Federal Land Bank to initiate foreclosure
proceedings. The key function of security interests in real estate is to
protect the mortgagee when the mortgagor fails to perform. The strict
security guidelines enacted by Congress would be of little value if the
Federal Land Bank could not start foreclosure proceedings to get possession of the collateral. In addition, Title 12, Section 2202a(j) of the United
States Code expressly states that foreclosure is an option that may be
exercised by the Federal Land Bank in certain situations."
In summary, judicial foreclosure was clearly intended by Congress to
be made available as a remedy to the Federal Land Banks. This intent is
implied in the provisions of the United States Code. However, it may be
argued that Congress did not intend for the remedy of foreclosure to be
available to the Federal Land Banks in all situations. Federal law should
control federal programs.9 9 Yet, where Congress has not spoken in an area
under federal control, the federal courts must determine the applicable
federal law.'10 This determination does not inevitably require a resort to
0
uniform federal rules.' '
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,'0 2 the United States Supreme
Court held that the courts must consider whether a federal program by
its nature must be uniform throughout the nation. Where there is not a
necessity for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be used as
the federal rule of decision. 03 When making this choice of law, courts
should consider the disruptive effect a uniform federal rule would have
on commercial relationships under the state law.'0 4
The right of Federal Land Banks to foreclose on nonperforming mortgages may readily be inferred from the federal statutes. However, a state
law limiting the enforcement of a federal right may sometimes be adopted
as the federal rule. 0 5 Therefore, if a state mortgage foreclosure moratorium
was enacted which applied to all agricultural lenders, the state could argue
97. See 12 U.S.C. § 2017 (1988).
98. Section 2202a(j) provides as follows:
This section shall not be construed to prevent any qualified lender from enforcing
any contractual provision that allows the lender to foreclose a loan or from
taking such other lawful action as the lender deems appropriate, if the lender
has reasonable grounds to believe that the loan collateral will be destroyed,
dissipated, consumed, concealed, or permanently removed from the State in which
the collateral is located.
12 U.S.C. § 2202a(j) (1988).
99. United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979).
100. Id. at 728.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 729.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 729-30.
105. United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1983).
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that this state law should be adopted as the federal common law. Thus,
the mortgage moratorium would be applicable to Federal Land Bank
mortgages within that state.0 6
The state could rely on Kimbell to argue that, although Congress intended the Federal Land Bank to be able to foreclose on its mortgages,
Congress did not intend the Federal Land Bank to be on unequal footing
with commercial lending institutions. Based on Kimbell, this appears to
be a situation where the nondiscriminatory application of state law should
serve as the federal law. If state law was not applied to the Federal Land
Bank, it would have a strong advantage over commercial lenders. Lending
relationships entered into under state law could also be disrupted. Therefore, state laws which limit the right of foreclosure should be adopted as
the federal law and applied to Federal Land Bank mortgages. This argument is only tenable if the state law is drafted to apply to all lending
institutions that make agricultural land loans.
The Future Of Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoriums
The constitutional hurdles encountered by the Act highlight the difficulty
in creating constitutional foreclosure moratorium legislation. However, as
the Court in Blaisdell and Hahn indicated, moratorium legislation can
exist within the bounds of the constitution. Economic conditions which
are conducive to foreclosure moratoriums will surely recur in Oklahoma's
future. Therefore, a brief summary of the characteristics of constitutionally
sound moratoriums may prove helpful to those who will be faced with
choosing a legislative response to conditions of economic distress.
The legislature should require judicial discretion in determining what
mortgagees to which a postponement of foreclosure should apply. This
judicial discretion would prevent the legislation from being considered
arbitrary. Any prohibition of foreclosure should be temporary, to qualify
as an alteration to a contractual remedy rather than an elimination of a
remedy. A foreclosure moratorium should become effective only when the
legislature determines that an emergency exists. If the moratorium legislation impairs contractual rights, the impairment would only be allowed
if it is a result of a reasonable exercise of the state's protective power in
response to the emergency. Such a law should not impair the mortgage
indebtedness and must provide protection to the mortgagee during the
106. This approach is consistent with the rationale of Kimbell Foods. The federal statutes
do not expressly require that the Federal Land Bank be able to foreclose on its mortgages
regardless of state law. Also, this does not appear to be an area that requires a nationally
uniform law. There are separate Federal Land Banks in the different regions of the country.
These regional Federal Land Banks have numerous Federal Land Bank Associations within
their regions. As noted earlier, the Associations operate very much like privately owned lending
institutions. These characteristics make the relationship between the Federal Land Bank and
its borrowers closer to private sector transactions than transactions between a borrower and
the government. These relationships are not distinguishable from the relationship between a
privately-owned commercial bank and its borrowers.
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period of the moratorium. These limitations can be met if the legislation
requires the mortgagor, upon application to the court for protection under
a mortgage foreclosure moratorium act, to pay a fair rental value for the
period covered by such act. This rent can be apportioned to property
taxes, accruing interest, and rent for the actual possession of the property.
The safest way to avoid equal protection claims would be to apply the
legislation to all mortgagees of nonperforming mortgages. If the law were
to be applied to a particular classification, special care would have to be
taken to insure that the classification is based upon differences bearing
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.
If the Federal Land Bank or similar "federal instrumentalities" were to
seek protection from the legislation under the preemption doctrine, they
would probably be unsuccessful. Because Congress did not expressly grant
the Federal Land Bank the right to foreclose mortgages without regard to
state law, the courts will probably adopt state law to serve as the federal
rule. It seems fair to treat the Federal Land Bank and commercial lenders
equally because their operations are very similar. However, this reasoning
only applies if the law were to be applied to all commercial lenders and
not exclusively to the Federal Land Bank.
Conclusion
There are potential negative effects which can result from the use of
mortgage foreclosure moratoriums. 0 7 However, this note focused on the
constitutionality of foreclosure moratoriums rather than their effectiveness
in remedying economic distress. In spite of potential negative effects, a
valid moratorium statute provides immediate and tangible relief to borrowers who otherwise may lose their land, livelihood and cultural identity
as a result of an economic emergency they have no way of preventing.
The public perception of foreclosure moratoriums as a shield to otherwise
helpless borrowers insures that moratoriums will be a source of legislative
debate when the next economic emergency occurs.
Kenneth R. Davis

107. Availability of funds to the farm sector may be reduced as lenders reallocate their
resources to reduce losses. Interest costs may rise as lenders attempt to maintain earnings at
acceptable levels. Finally, some high-risk, credit worthy borrowers will be refused additional
credit because of the lenders' heightened aversion to the risk of default. Lenders will experience
continued lower earnings on capital tied-up by the moratorium and if land values decline
during the moratorium the lenders will sustain capital losses. Legislative intervention may harm
relations between the borrower and lender, and some lenders will accelerate foreclosure activities
in anticipation of moratorium legislation. Farm ForeclosureMoratoriaand the Contract Clause:
An Economic Analysis, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 340-41 (1986).
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